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On Moral Arguments Against a Legal Right to Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention∗ 
 Under current international law, armed intervention in the territory of another 
state is legally permissible only in self-defense or when authorized by the United Nations, 
and in the latter case, only for the purpose of maintaining international peace and 
security.  Over the past decade, however, events in the Balkans, Rwanda, East Timor, and 
elsewhere have led politicians as well as theorists to question both of these conditions on 
the legality of intervention.   
Most of the debate has focused on the second of these two requirements: the 
possible legal justifications for intervention (or, to use the terminology of just war theory, 
what counts as a just cause).  For example, a number of political philosophers and 
international lawyers have recently challenged the traditional notion of sovereignty that 
limits international law to regulating the relations amongst states, and so places outside 
the purview of international law those persecutions, ethnic cleansings, and other atrocities 
that take place solely within the borders of a single state.1  If successful, arguments of this 
sort may contribute to a change in international law whereby a state’s treatment of those 
within its borders, as well as its behavior in the international sphere, can provide a legal 
justification for intervention by other states.  On a practical level, however, a change to 
the possible legal justifications for intervention may be less important than a change in 
who may exercise the legal authority to intervene.  A state’s widespread violation of its 
subjects’ most basic rights almost always has repercussions beyond the state’s border, 
and the United Nations has demonstrated a willingness to interpret the idea of a threat to 
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international peace and security quite broadly.  If the international community wishes to 
intervene, it can probably justify such an action under existing international law.   
As the international response to recent events in Darfur demonstrates, the 
restriction of authority to intervene to the United Nations poses the greater legal barrier to 
intervention.  From a practical perspective, then, the more pressing question may be 
whether international law ought to be modified to permit states, or multi-state 
organizations, to carry out unilateral humanitarian interventions; that is, interventions that 
are not authorized by the United Nations.  The issue here is essentially a moral one: 
would the incorporation of a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention entail a moral 
improvement to international law – for example, a decrease in the number and severity of 
basic human rights violations that occur under it – or would it instead lead to an even 
greater disparity between legality and morality?  Those theorists who have considered the 
issue have been quick to assert the latter, emphasizing in particular the possibility that 
states would abuse a unilateral right to humanitarian intervention, so that ultimately a 
legal system that included such a right would facilitate greater human rights violations 
than occur under the present international legal system.  Though this conclusion may be 
correct, this essay maintains that the arguments that have been provided to support it are 
inadequate to that task. 
 Much of the debate over the moral case for reforming international law to include 
a unilateral right to humanitarian intervention has focused on NATO’s 1998 intervention 
in Kosovo.  The discussion herein does the same, though as noted above, the current 
situation in Darfur renews the urgency of this debate.  Section I concerns the 
characterization of the right to unilateral humanitarian intervention that NATO might 
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have proposed to justify its actions in Kosovo.  Specifically, NATO need only have 
asserted a right to unilateral intervention on the part of multi-state organizations, 
members of which have varying degrees of military and economic power, and in which 
each member exercises a veto over the organization’s policies, in a state that is inflicting 
a humanitarian disaster on its citizens (or a portion thereof).2  As section II demonstrates, 
this relatively narrow construal of the legal right to unilateral humanitarian intervention 
renders it less open to the abuse that Allen Buchanan appeals to when arguing that the 
incorporation of such a right would lead to the moral deterioration, rather than 
improvement, of international law.  Moreover, any state likely to abuse the right to 
unilateral humanitarian intervention is already likely to abuse the right to self-defense to 
justify its conduct.  In short, it is far from clear that the new legal right in question will 
result in a greater number of basic human rights violations than occur under the existing 
international legal system. 
 Section III examines several other possible objections to a narrowly defined legal 
right to unilateral humanitarian intervention.  These include (1) an argument from 
unfairness in the application of the law (i.e. which states are likely to find the right in 
question exercised against them); (2) an argument that recognition of such a right, even if 
morally unproblematic itself, will lead inevitably down a slippery slope to the recognition 
of legal rights that are morally problematic; (3) arguments concerning the impact a right 
to unilateral humanitarian intervention will have on diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts 
peacefully; and (4) the objection that legal recognition of a right to unilateral 
humanitarian intervention is incompatible with the rule of law.  Neither of the first two 
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arguments succeeds, the third is inconclusive, while the fourth reduces to the abuse 
objection examined in section II. 
Before proceeding to these arguments, however, several points about the type of 
project undertaken here must be noted.  First, and most importantly, this essay does not 
claim that NATO acted legally when it intervened in Kosovo.  Nor is it clear that NATO 
or the member states that constituted it intended that their intervention establish (or be 
part of a process establishing) a unilateral right to intervention, however specified.3  Thus 
the arguments of this paper are to a significant degree counter-factual.  The aim is to 
examine the kind of arguments NATO and its members might have made were they 
committed to creating a new norm of international law.  These arguments are of more 
than just theoretical interest, however, since they are the kind of considerations that states 
might appeal to in the future if they wish to advocate or oppose changes to the 
international law governing the use of force. 
Second, even if a legal right to unilateral humanitarian intervention had existed at 
the time of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, that action might still have been illegal (and 
immoral) in virtue of the way NATO conducted it.  It does not follow from an agent 
having a right to X that the agent is morally or legally permitted to X in whatever way he 
chooses.  Other rights or values may limit the means by which the agent can exercise his 
right to X.  The issue in question in this paper concerns when going to war is legally 
justifiable – a question of whether a state has a right to X.  Even should a right to 
unilateral humanitarian intervention eventually be recognized, however, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that the exercise of that right will be limited by existing legal (and 
moral) constraints on how the right to wage war can be exercised.4  Though detailed 
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discussion of this topic is not possible here, it is not implausible to think that NATO 
pursued its intervention in Kosovo in ways that violated legal (and moral) constraints on 
the conduct of warfare, and that it did so knowingly (and perhaps even deliberately).  
Thus even if the international legal community had already recognized a right of the type 
under discussion in this paper, it would not follow that NATO’s intervention would have 
been perfectly legal.  
I 
 Allen Buchanan notes that “whether or not the NATO intervention [in Kosovo] 
can be described as an act of illegal reform that would, if successful, bring about a major 
[moral] improvement in the [international legal] system depends upon the precise 
characterization of the norm that this illegal act is likely to contribute to the establishment 
of – and upon whether a norm of this character would be likely to be abused.”5  This 
section offers a characterization of the legal norm implied by NATO’s intervention, one 
that construes the right to unilateral intervention more narrowly than Buchanan does.6  
The following sections consider various arguments that might be offered to show that 
even as that norm is specified here, the moral case against it remains stronger than the 
moral case in its favor. 
 The creation of a new customary legal norm requires that international legal 
actors undertake a certain kind of conduct, under a certain description, and do so from the 
belief that the law requires the conduct so described.7  Thus if NATO’s intervention in 
Kosovo is to be understood as establishing, or as contributing to the establishment of, a 
new norm of international law, how NATO characterized its action is crucial to the moral 
evaluation of the new customary norm.  Of course, as noted above, though NATO and 
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some of its member states did initially advocate for a new legal right to intervention, or 
argue that the intervention was already legal under existing international law, support for 
such a position later waned.  Still, drawing on certain statements made by NATO and its 
member states leading up to its intercession in Kosovo, it is possible to infer the content 
of the new legal norm that NATO and its member states might have advanced, had they 
remained determined to reform the existing law governing the use of force. 
 Buchanan argues that a proper characterization of the norm implied by NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo must include “the assertion [that] the requirement of Security 
Council authorization is a defect in the [international legal] system” and recognize “the 
fact that the intervention was undertaken by a regional military alliance whose 
constitutional identity is that of a pact for defense of its members against aggression.”8  
The reason for the former claim should be clear; if the need for Security Council 
authorization (except in cases of self-defense) is not a defect in the international legal 
system, then what justification can there be for a state or group of states to assert a legal 
right to unilateral intervention?  Whether or not the requirement of Security Council 
authorization is a (moral) defect depends on a comparison of the likelihood and number 
and/or magnitude of human rights violations that are occurring (or will occur) under such 
a system, and the likelihood and number and/or magnitude of human rights violations that 
will occur under some alternative system – in this case, a system that includes a legal 
right to unilateral intervention.  Buchanan asserts that the latter legal system would be 
worse than the former, from the standpoint of securing respect for human rights, because 
a right to unilateral intervention would be liable to abuse, and so lead to more and greater 
violence.  Before examining this argument, however, consider the second fact that 
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Buchanan claims must be recognized in the new norm implied by the intervention in 
Kosovo: that it was undertaken by NATO. 
 The reason this fact must be recognized by the new norm, Buchanan contends, is 
that “those who undertook the intervention and their supporters emphasized that it was 
conducted by NATO.”9  The crucial question for determining the content of the new 
norm is why they did so.  Buchanan’s answer is “because they thought that this fact made 
the justification for it stronger than would have been the case had it been undertaken by a 
mere collection of states.”10  Though this claim is correct, Buchanan seriously understates 
the way in which this fact made NATO’s justification stronger, as well as its implications 
for the content of the new norm NATO might have proposed.  First, by emphasizing that 
NATO, a multi-state organization intended to provide for collective defense, undertook 
the intervention, those who interceded in Kosovo attempted to demonstrate that the 
intervention was not undertaken as a means for territorial or economic aggrandizement, 
or the settling of old scores.11  This should not be taken to deny that NATO was 
motivated, at least in part, by considerations of self-interest.  These include concern on 
the part of member states that they would be swamped with refugees, and that greater 
instability in the Balkans would provide fertile ground for international criminal 
organizations.12  But that the motives of states claiming to intervene on humanitarian 
grounds should be “pure” seems an impossibly high standard, and not obviously one that 
must be attained.  After all, in an interpersonal context we do not require that people 
always act from a pure motive; as Kant argues, such a motive may be necessary for an 
agent to be morally worthy, but it is not necessary for that agent to act in accordance with 
morality.  Perhaps it suffices, then, that intervening states demonstrate that they are not 
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motivated by certain reprehensible motives, such as territorial or economic 
aggrandizement, even if their motives are not pure. 
 Second, NATO intervention required the agreement of a number of states; it was 
not a unilateral action taken by one powerful state.  Moreover, a number of these states 
were militarily and (at least vis-à-vis the U.S.) economically weak ones, and so could be 
expected to be concerned with the weakening of the prohibition on unilateral intervention 
(particularly given the history of warfare in Europe).  The consent of these states, and 
indeed their active involvement in the operation (though it was predominately American) 
places important constraints on the new norm of intervention.  It might be plausibly 
inferred that intervention in the absence of Security Council authorization still requires 
the consent of states representing a range of military and economic power, and so perhaps 
representing different degrees of need for, and commitment to, caution in condoning and 
participating in unilateral interventions.  Indeed, the consent of NATO’s weaker member 
states to intervention in Kosovo may come closer to representing the interests of weak 
and strong states than does the requirement of Security Council authorization, since 
NATO’s weaker member states still exercise an individual veto on NATO operations, 
while weaker states on the Security Council do not.  It may also be true that NATO’s 
weaker member states are better able to resist behind the scenes arm-twisting by powerful 
states than are weak states serving a stint on the Security Council.  In sum, it is not 
obvious how vulnerable the norm implied by NATO’s intervention in Kosovo is to the 
objection that it will encourage predation by stronger states on weak ones; but as will 
become clear below, this concern is an important reason Buchanan cites for rejecting 
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NATO intervention, understood as an illegal reform of international law aimed at 
establishing a unilateral right to intervention. 
 Another manner in which Buchanan sometimes seems to under-describe the right 
to unilateral intervention implied by NATO’s actions in Kosovo involves the 
circumstances in which such a right may be exercised.  It may well be that a right to 
unilateral intervention, even when restricted to multi-state defense organizations, or other 
military organizations recognized under article 52 of the U.N. charter, would simply be 
too liable to abuse.  The result would be an increase in warfare and other forms of 
political violence, and the concomitant violations of human rights, in comparison to the 
present international legal regime.  But what seems to be implied by NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo is not a right to unilateral intervention whenever an organization 
of states wishes to intervene, or even when a state treats its citizens (or some portion 
thereof) unjustly, but rather a right to unilateral intervention when a state is inflicting a 
humanitarian disaster upon its citizens (or some portion thereof), and perhaps 
additionally, when the Security Council is unwilling to act.  This appears to be the 
position defended by the United Kingdom’s delegate to the United Nations, in an 
emergency meeting of the Security Council following the commencement of NATO’s 
bombing campaign on March 24, 1999.  
Every means short of force has been tried to avert this situation.  In these 
circumstances, and as an exceptional measure on grounds of 
overwhelming humanitarian necessity, military intervention is legally 
justifiable.  The force now proposed is directed exclusively to averting a 
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humanitarian catastrophe, and is the minimum judged necessary for that 
purpose.13  
There is good reason to believe, then, that in specifying the new legal norm that 
empowers them to intervene in Kosovo, NATO and its member states would incorporate 
what Buchanan labels “the familiar and widely acknowledged conditions for justified 
intervention.”14 
 Suppose, then, that the right to unilateral intervention is restricted to cases where 
a state is inflicting, is about to inflict, or is unable to prevent others from inflicting, a 
humanitarian disaster on its citizens, or some portion thereof.  It is true that the concept of 
a humanitarian disaster is a somewhat vague concept, but this is not to say that the 
concept has no content at all.  Indeed, there appears to be fairly widespread agreement on 
the general description of a humanitarian disaster as the widespread and systematic 
violation of basic human rights.15  This suggests that a legal right to unilateral 
humanitarian intervention simply faces the same kind of problems as do the right to 
freedom of speech, or the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments.  Like 
those rights, a legal right to unilateral humanitarian intervention would have cases in 
which it clearly applies (e.g. Rwanda in 1994) and cases where it would not (e.g. present 
day Sweden), and of course there would be cases that fall in what H.L.A. Hart called the 
penumbra of a law.16  Unless the law in question is understood to list exhaustively the 
instances that fall under it, the penumbra cannot be eliminated, but its scope can be 
narrowed or enlarged as a result of an evolving but informal shared understanding of 
what qualifies as a humanitarian disaster, and/or formal determinations of this matter by 
authoritative sources such as courts or treaties.  Even if the scope of the right in question 
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were interpreted fairly broadly, the content of the norm alone would place some 
constraints on the number and type of cases where states or regional military 
organizations could plausibly claim to be exercising it.  Of course, this assumes (as does 
this entire paper) that it is important to states to at least be able to make a case, the more 
plausible the better, that their actions are legal.  This seems to be a safe assumption, at 
least so long as no further claim is made regarding why states wish their actions to be 
viewed as legal by other states.   
 There are good reasons, however, to suspect that the concept of a humanitarian 
disaster, and so of a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention, would come to be 
understood narrowly instead.  As indicated above, militarily and economically weak 
states would have a powerful interest in limiting the cases where international actors 
could exercise such a right.  But so too would members of certain ideological groups in 
powerful states.  The recognition of a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention might 
well facilitate the efforts of individuals and groups within a powerful state who are 
inclined to a cosmopolitan ideology to press for more frequent interventions.  
Isolationists, and in most cases Realists, would therefore have good reason to advocate a 
narrow construal of the phrase ‘humanitarian disaster,’ at least as it is used in 
international law, so as to avoid being drawn into conflicts and foreign entanglements 
that, for moral and/or prudential reasons, they believe the powerful state ought to avoid.17  
Finally, even cosmopolitan-minded individuals might support a narrow reading of the 
right under discussion, if it turned out that by making the legal recognition of 
humanitarian disaster rarer, states were more likely to intervene when such legal 
recognition was granted.  If these arguments are correct, and again assuming the 
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importance to just about every state of being able to make a plausible case for the legality 
of its conduct, then the very content of a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention 
might provide a significant barrier to its abuse. 
 Thus far it has been argued that the right to unilateral intervention implied by 
NATO’s actions in Kosovo can be plausibly understood in fairly narrow terms.  
Specifically, it is a right to unilateral intervention by a multi-state organization, members 
of which have varying degrees of military and economic power, and where each exercises 
a veto over the organization’s policies, in a state that is inflicting a humanitarian disaster 
on its citizens (or a portion thereof).  The question to be addressed in the rest of this paper 
is whether the incorporation of such a right into international law would result in a 
morally better international legal system than currently exists. 
II 
 Buchanan and many others primarily object to a right to unilateral intervention, 
even when limited to responding to cases of alleged humanitarian disaster, because they 
believe that such a right would be too liable to abuse.  Ultimately, they claim, the 
proposed modification to the international legal system would result in an increase, rather 
than a decrease, in political violence and the violation of human rights.  Or in other 
words, the reformed international legal system would be less substantively just than the 
existing international legal system. 
 When evaluating the “abuse objection,” it is crucial that we note precisely the 
kind of empirical support necessary to substantiate such a claim.  Specifically, it must be 
the case that there are (or will be) states (or better, multi-state organizations) that would 
not unjustly intervene in another state, but for the possibility of defending their conduct 
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as just on the basis of the proposed right to unilateral humanitarian intervention.  Thus, 
neither the behavior of states that use force (or will use force) against other states 
regardless of the requirements of international law, nor the behavior of states that claim 
to be (or will claim to be) justified in the use force on the basis of self-defense, will 
provide evidence to support the claim of likely abuse.  The latter point in particular bears 
repeating; what is the likelihood that a case will arise where a state believes it can 
plausibly justify its use of force against another state on the basis of a right to unilateral 
humanitarian intervention, but does not believe that it can plausibly justify its use of force 
by appeal to a unilateral right to self-defense?   
 Though a systematic case cannot be presented here, the conjecture is that any state 
that might consider abusing the right to unilateral humanitarian intervention is already 
likely to abuse the right to self-defense to justify its conduct.  Consider, for example, the 
instances of armed intervention often identified as the most plausible examples of 
morally justifiable illegal humanitarian intervention: East Pakistan/Bangladesh in 1971, 
Uganda in 1978-9, and Kampuchea/Cambodia in 1978-9.  In all three cases, the states in 
question also appealed to their right to the unilateral exercise of force in self-defense to 
justify their actions.  Moreover, in two of the three cases the state’s intervention was 
“shielded” by the simultaneous actions of national liberation groups supported by the 
invading states.  The suggestion, then, is that if a state wishes to invade another state, it 
seems at least as easy, if not easier, to create the conditions for the exercise of a right to 
self-defense as it does to create the conditions for the exercise of a right to unilateral 
humanitarian intervention.  All the state need do is offer covert support to a rebel military 
group in the target state, as Rwanda has done in the Congo, and as Tanzania did in 
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Uganda.  In sum, the suspicion is that there are no states that (a) wish to invade another 
state, and (b) do not believe they can even begin to make a case for doing so on grounds 
of self-defense, nor bring about a situation in which they could begin to make such a 
case, but (c) do believe they can make a case for invading on the basis of a right to 
unilateral humanitarian intervention, or can bring about a situation in which they might 
begin to make such a case. 
 In order to show that a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention would lead to 
greater violations of basic human rights than occur under the present system, it is 
necessary to factor in both how often an act of political violence that would not otherwise 
have taken place will occur, and how much harm will result from such an act.  This essay 
claims that the frequency of the type of acts a proponent of the abuse objection needs to 
buttress his claim would be very low.  But perhaps the number of rights violations that 
would result from the few abuses of a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention would 
exceed the number of rights violations that occur (or will occur) under the current 
international legal system.  While the veracity of this claim is far from clear, such a 
possibility cannot be denied.  Still, a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention is a not 
a right to intervene in whatever manner one chooses; the existing laws governing the 
conduct of wars still hold.  Of course, a state that abuses the right to humanitarian 
intervention may also feel little compunction when it comes to violating these laws as 
well.  But then, is such a state really likely to be one that would refrain from intervening 
in another state but for the pretext provided by a legal right to unilateral humanitarian 
intervention? 
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 In his brief discussion of the ways in which a right to unilateral intervention might 
be abused, Buchanan hints at the possibility of China and Pakistan forming a regional 
military organization, which in turn justifies its invasion of Indian-governed Kashmir by 
appeal to such a right.  Ignore for now the fact that however unjust India’s treatment of 
Muslim’s in Kashmir may be, it does not reach the level of a humanitarian disaster.18  
More importantly, a sufficient appraisal of the new legal rule permitting unilateral 
humanitarian intervention would require an examination of its implications for a wide 
range of actual and hypothetical interventions.  It may be that even if the implications in 
Buchanan’s hypothetical case would be bad, the implications in many other cases might 
be good, so that the sum total of interventions produced fewer human rights violations 
overall than occur under the present international rules governing the use of force.19  The 
complaint here is not that Buchanan fails to martial enough empirical support for his 
conclusion; much of that evidence would be conjectural, and in any case, the philosopher 
plays only one part in a debate to which many different disciplines must contribute.  
Rather, the objection is a methodological one: pointing to one possible event that might 
occur under a reformed international legal system, even a particularly troubling one, is 
simply not enough to establish that the reform ought not to be made.  Without further 
evidence and argumentation, the reader ought not to draw the conclusion that advocates 
of the abuse argument against a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention would have 
him or her accept. 
 States are not the only actors who might abuse the legal recognition of a right to 
unilateral humanitarian intervention, thereby causing greater human rights violations (in 
number and/or in magnitude) than occur under the present system.  Such a right might 
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also encourage national liberation groups (genuine or not) to attack the states from which 
they wish to secede, or rebel groups to attack the governments they wish to replace, in an 
effort to manipulate other states into helping them to achieve their liberation or 
revolution.  Though unable to mobilize the military power and/or popular support 
necessary to achieve their ends, such groups might instigate the target state or 
government into responding in ways that caused a humanitarian disaster.  Though other 
states might intervene for purely humanitarian reasons, such interventions would at the 
least provide the liberation or revolutionary group with greater freedom to recruit and 
train fighters, and greater security from which to build popular support and coordinate 
future political and military actions.  At most, such a strategy might engage the 
intervening state in advancing the cause of liberation or revolution.20  Under a reformed 
international legal system, the incentives for liberation and revolutionary groups to 
employ this tactic might be greater than at present, since they would only need to 
convince a subset of existing states that intervention was warranted, rather than a 
majority of the Security Council, together with the assent or abstention of the permanent 
members.   
In response to this concern, a defender of the right to unilateral intervention might 
argue that some liberation and revolutionary groups will be unwilling to deliberately 
impose the costs involved in such a strategy on the population whose interests they seek 
to advance.  Those groups not so inclined will already be disposed to employ this 
strategy, because either (a) they are willing to deliberately impose whatever costs are 
necessary to convince the Security Council to authorize intervention on grounds of 
international peace and stability, or (b) they believe they can mobilize enough political 
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pressure on third-party states to move those states to intervene, regardless of the legality 
of doing so.  In short, as with the earlier response to the possibility of state abuse of the 
right to unilateral humanitarian intervention, the response in the case of national 
liberation groups is that there are few, if any, non-state groups that would forbear from 
deliberately inciting a humanitarian disaster under the present international legal system, 
but who would were the proposed reform to occur. 
 Even if the preceding arguments are correct, they only show that a right to 
unilateral humanitarian intervention would not lead to abuse, or that on balance the abuse 
would not outweigh the benefits resulting from the existence of such a right.  These 
arguments do not speak to cases where states mistakenly believe that by exercising the 
right to unilateral humanitarian intervention, they will reduce the number of human rights 
violations.  That is, even if legal permission to unilaterally intervene would not lead to 
(much) abuse, it might lead to many cases of unwise but well-intentioned exercise of the 
right, with the end result being greater violations of human rights than occur under the 
present international legal system.  The question of whether, on the whole, humanitarian 
interventions contribute to greater or fewer violations of human rights is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  Still, if even well-intentioned humanitarian interventions lead in the 
end to greater violations of human rights, then this might well provide a strong argument 
against incorporating a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention into international 
law.21  Note, however, that such an argument would not be premised on the abuse of such 
a right; that is, it would not be the argument that Buchanan and many others offer as their 
primary reason for rejecting a legal right to unilateral humanitarian intervention. 
 18 
III 
 In addition to worries that a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention might be 
abused, several other objections to such a right might be advanced.  The first such 
objection concerns unfairness in the application of international law; specifically, the use 
of the right to unilateral humanitarian intervention to enforce respect for basic human 
rights.22  The recognition of such a right would be unfair to weak states because while 
they would be susceptible to invasion, powerful states would not be.  Even if there were a 
right to unilaterally intervene in Russia, or at least Chechnya, in light of the Russian 
government’s treatment of the civilian population in that province, surely no state or 
organization of states would bear the costs involved in doing so.  The same is not true, 
however, in weaker states such as the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or perhaps 
Sudan. 
 Suppose that under a reformed international legal system, weak states (like the 
former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) would suffer intervention if they created (or 
permitted) a humanitarian disaster for some or all of their citizens, while powerful states 
like Russia would be able to act, more or less, with impunity.  While Russia’s ability to 
do so would constitute an injustice, it is not obviously a matter of unfairness.  Unfairness 
is a comparative wrong, but the injustice involved in Russia’s treatment of civilians in 
Chechnya is not comparative.23  That is, the injustice does not lie in Yugoslavia being 
treated in a way that Russia is not, where the two states being treated in the same way is 
essential to their being treated justly.  Rather, the injustice lies in Russia being free to 
violate the basic human rights of a segment of its population.  That Yugoslavia is not 
similarly free to do so is not in any sense an injustice to Yugoslavia.24   
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 An analogy to the receipt of a speeding ticket may help illustrate this point.  A 
person ticketed for speeding cannot justifiably complain about her treatment simply 
because tickets are not handed out to every person who violates the speed limit.  That the 
law has not been enforced in all those cases where it might be enforced does not entail 
that one is treated unjustly when the law is enforced in one’s own case.25 
 On the other hand, Buchanan may be correct when he argues that the impartial 
enforcement of the law is integral to the ideal of the rule of law, and that approximation 
to this ideal is one of the moral standards against which we ought to evaluate a legal 
system.  While impartiality does not require that the law be enforced in every case where 
such action would be justifiable, it does require the absence of any bias in the selection of 
those agents that will have the law enforced against them.  At this point, the analogy 
between the enforcement of respect for basic human rights through the exercise of a right 
to unilateral humanitarian intervention, and the enforcement of speed limit laws (in a just 
state), breaks down.  Enforcement of the law in the first case appears to depend on factors 
that ought to be irrelevant from a moral standpoint, such as the relative military and 
economic power of the state causing (or permitting) a humanitarian disaster.  It as if a 
state were to enforce speed limit laws selectively, exempting certain parties because they 
can afford cars that are too fast to catch, or because they are so strong they could beat up 
any police officer who tried to ticket them.  Surely there is a comparative injustice here, 
and so perhaps weak states are right to complain that the legal recognition of a right to 
unilateral humanitarian intervention will create, or more realistically, exacerbate 
unfairness in the international legal system.   
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 Yet it must be asked whether this unfairness warrants rejecting such a right.  
Consider, first, that the present international legal system already contains a great deal of 
unfairness of this sort; presumably Russia will not permit the Security Council to 
authorize intervention in Chechnya.  The question, then, is which of two legal systems, 
neither of them particularly fair in their enforcement of the law, is morally better: one that 
includes a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention, or one that does not.  In 
answering this question, it seems the focus should be on the number of human rights 
violations that will occur under these two systems.  The fact that no one will exercise this 
right against a powerful state simply entails that, for purposes of evaluating the two legal 
systems, human rights violations in powerful states should be ignored, since they will 
occur under both legal systems.  
 A second objection to a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention takes the 
form of a slippery slope argument.  Even if a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention 
would on balance result in fewer rights violations, might the recognition of such a right 
lead to the establishment of other rights to unilateral action that would produce greater 
violations of basic human rights?  Similarly, even if a right to unilateral humanitarian 
intervention could be fairly circumscribed, and so subject to very little abuse, might its 
recognition lead to the establishment of other rights that would be subject to substantial 
abuse (even if the recognition of those further rights, absent any abuse of them, would 
morally improve the international legal system)?  Logical necessity need not lead down 
this slope; it is logically possible to draw clear and substantial distinctions between a 
right to unilateral humanitarian intervention and other possible rights to unilateral action.  
Indeed, the likelihood that some other right to unilateral action might lead to an increase 
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in the number of basic human rights violations provides one basis upon which to make 
such a distinction.  Nor is there any reason to assume that some sort of natural necessity, 
some rule of human psychology or institutional design, inevitably draws people down 
this slope.  Finally, it should be noted that insofar as the international legal system 
already recognizes a right to the unilateral use of force in self-defense, it is already on the 
slippery slope of unilateral action.  Any slippery slope criticism of a right to unilateral 
humanitarian intervention will therefore apply equally well to the right to the unilateral 
use of force in self-defense; but, presumably, the propriety of such a right is not in doubt.   
 The potential consequences that legal recognition of a right to unilateral 
humanitarian intervention will have on efforts to resolve diplomatically existing or 
impending humanitarian disasters comprise a third argument against such a reform to the 
international legal system.  Under the present system, the difficulty states (or regional 
defense organizations) have in obtaining U.N. Security Council authorization for the use 
of force provides them with an incentive to use non-coercive means to correct a state’s 
violation of its citizens’ basic human rights.  Under a reformed international legal system, 
states might resort more quickly to coercive measures, including intervention.  The 
present legal constraints on the use of force may also encourage potentially intervening 
states to remain engaged in negotiations with the rights-violating state longer than they 
would otherwise choose, and to make compromises with that state they might not make 
were they to have a legal right to intervene unilaterally.  Of course, prolonged 
negotiations and compromises in specific demands regarding a state’s treatment of its 
citizens have a cost in terms of human rights violations, but that cost may be lower than 
the one entailed by the legal recognition of a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention. 
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  A related concern regarding the effects such a right would have on diplomacy 
and the use of force involves the likelihood that having threatened to exercise the right to 
unilateral intervention, states would feel compelled to follow through with their threat 
because of the consequences non-intervention would have for their reputation, and so for 
future negotiations.  Simon Chesterman claims, for instance, that  
a credible argument may be made that NATO commenced air strikes 
[against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] primarily because it had said 
it would.  Amid the talk of preserving NATO’s ‘credibility’, a widely held 
view, articulated most bluntly by Henry Kissinger, was that whatever folly 
led NATO into battle ‘victory is the only exit strategy’.26   
Just such a worry is one reason why Realist members of powerful states (such as 
Kissinger) could be expected to advocate for a narrow understanding of humanitarian 
disaster, as noted in section I.  Still, the concern that a right to unilateral humanitarian 
intervention might result in “reputational interventions,” and so contribute to an increase 
in the violation of basic human rights, cannot be denied.  However, it must be balanced 
against the apparent fact that states creating or permitting a humanitarian disaster among 
their own citizens almost always fail to respond to demands for changes in their behavior 
that are not backed by force, or the credible threat thereof.  It may be, then, that an 
occasional “reputational intervention” is a necessary side effect of an overall policy - 
namely one that includes the possibility of unilateral humanitarian intervention - that 
reduces the incidence and magnitude of humanitarian disasters. 
 Against these reasonable worries that a right to unilateral humanitarian 
intervention might lessen attempts to resolve humanitarian disasters peacefully must be 
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weighed certain reasons to think that such a right might make diplomatic efforts more 
fruitful.  For example, the possibility that states might intervene unilaterally should the 
U.N. not act might lead to a greater willingness to compromise on the part of member 
states, including the permanent members of the Security Council.  Likewise those states 
directly responsible for a humanitarian disaster may be more inclined to negotiate, and 
live up to, a settlement regarding their treatment of their citizens when negotiation takes 
place against the backdrop of a legal right to unilateral humanitarian intervention.  I 
conclude, therefore, that the consequences for diplomatic efforts to address humanitarian 
disasters do not clearly favor nor count against such a right. 
 But perhaps these suggestions about the impact a right to unilateral humanitarian 
intervention might have on negotiations in the Security Council are moot.  Perhaps 
Michael Byers and Chesterman are correct when they write, “states are not champing at 
the bit to intervene in support of human rights around the globe, prevented only by an 
intransigent Security Council and the absence of clear criteria to intervene without its 
authority.”27  If true, and it almost surely is, this fact implies that the legal recognition of 
a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention would be unlikely to lead to an increase in 
genuinely humanitarian interventions, the goal which is after all the reason to advocate 
for such a right in the first place.  As Byers and Chesterman note, what is missing 
amongst states is the will to act at all.  But in this regard a right to unilateral humanitarian 
intervention might make a difference.  The present international legal system provides 
those in government with a useful excuse for not pursuing humanitarian intervention.  
Leaders can tell those who advocate for intervention in a particular case that while they 
sympathize with their cause, too many in the international community do not, and only a 
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consensus in the international community, or at least as much of a consensus as is 
reflected in Security Council authorization, can make intervention legitimate.  The legal 
recognition of a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention would remove this excuse.  
It would also enable groups advocating for humanitarian intervention in a particular case 
to focus their limited resources on a smaller number of states, at least once their initial 
effort to convince the Security Council had come to naught.  Persuading states to mount a 
humanitarian intervention is likely to remain hard work.  But the possibility of 
circumventing the barrier created by one permanent member’s recalcitrance to such 
action in a particular case, as with Russia’s opposition to intervention in Kosovo, might 
make that work a bit easier.28        
One last objection to the incorporation into international law of a right to 
unilateral humanitarian intervention involves the challenge such a right poses to the rule 
of law.  It is important to distinguish here between the challenge for the rule of law 
presented by any illegal act aimed at reform of international law, and that posed 
specifically by the legal recognition of a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention (and 
perhaps other rights to unilateral action).  The former concern points to an apparent 
inconsistency between fidelity to law on the one hand, and legally unjustifiable violation 
of the law on the other, even if for the purpose of reform.  Buchanan presents a 
convincing response to this worry, which need not be repeated here.29  Instead, the focus 
will be on the latter concern; that there is something particularly problematic about legal 
recognition of a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention from the standpoint of the 
rule of law. 
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Chesterman eloquently presents this concern in the conclusion to his book Just 
War or Just Peace? where he writes that  
the danger of an international rule of law being subverted to legitimating 
the interests of the Great Powers is still preferable to the unregulated 
exercise of that power.  Even though Security Council resolutions 
authorizing interventions might have been drafted in the war rooms of 
states preparing military action, adopted in votes of questionable 
impartiality, and implemented by states of dubious disinterestedness, such 
limitations do less damage to the international legal order than the 
abandonment of the multilateral institutions set in place after the Second 
World War that characterized NATO’s 1999 intervention in the FRY 
[Federal Republic of Yugoslavia].30   
In other words, the legal recognition of a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention will 
lead to the replacement of a proto-global order, founded on collective legal governance, 
with a balance of (regional) powers order, founded on a state of nature right to be judge 
in one’s own case.  The latter is inimical to the rule of law, however.  Buchanan, citing 
Locke, points out that partiality and inconsistency in the application of rules inevitably 
results when multiple agents independently formulate, interpret, and apply them.31  It is 
the avoidance of such a situation that justifies the creation of a legal system, and yet it 
seems that to recognize a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention would lead right 
back to it. 
Note, first, that this objection would not hold against any attempt at illegal reform 
of international law, but only those that aim to reform law by granting states rights to 
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unilateral action.  Second, this argument is usually not taken to exclude altogether an 
agent’s application of legal rules to his own case; most (all?) domestic legal systems 
recognize a unilateral right to use force in self-defense, and the international legal system 
recognizes an analogous right on the part of states.32  The question, then, is not whether 
agents ought to be permitted to be judges in their own cases, but rather in what 
circumstances should they be permitted to do so.  This brings us to the third point, 
namely that answering this question requires a consideration of the consequences that 
will likely follow from legal recognition of a right to be judge in one’s own case in 
various types of circumstances.  But this in turn leads back to the kind of arguments 
discussed earlier in this paper.  Chesterman’s rule of law concern probably rests on a 
view about the number of rights violations likely to occur under a reformed legal system 
(one that grants legal recognition to unilateral humanitarian intervention), in comparison 
to the number that will occur under the present system.  Perhaps he has additional 
slippery slope worries, of the type discussed earlier.  Though this essay has nothing more 
to say in response to these concerns, it is important to note that the rule of law objection, 
as Chesterman appears to be making it, does not constitute an additional objection to a 
legal right to unilateral humanitarian intervention. 
* * * 
In his most recent discussion of the morality of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, 
understood as an instance of illegal reform of international law, Buchanan focuses on 
additional steps a state aiming to reform customary international law ought to take, 
beyond the illegal act itself.  He writes that “by failing to do all it could have to specify 
the principle it was acting on, NATO ran the risk that its action would come to be viewed 
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as a precedent for a change in customary law that would not in fact be an improvement 
over the current requirements of Security Council authorization.”33  As a criticism of 
NATO this is not quite fair, since after some initial talk of reforming international law, its 
members decided not to treat intervention in Kosovo as an initial step in the creation of a 
new customary law, and instead emphasized that their actions should not be taken to be a 
contribution to the creation of new rules governing the use of force.  But Buchanan’s 
general point is still a good one; given the degree to which a proposed new customary 
rule of international law can be altered by the process for vetting that rule as a legally 
valid one, states that claim to be engaged in morally justified IRIL ought to couple their 
initial illegal act with further efforts to ensure that the new rule really does morally 
improve international law.  This point is consistent with the arguments of this paper, 
however, and it is mentioned only to preempt the reader’s confusing Buchanan’s 
criticism of NATO’s actions on this basis with his distinct criticism of the 
characterization of a right to unilateral intervention, with which this paper has taken 
issue.  
 In the same work, Buchanan also considers the possibility of characterizing the 
unilateral right to intervention NATO might have proposed as one that can be exercised 
only by liberal democratic states.   
All members of NATO are liberal-democratic countries, with free presses 
and a political culture that questions government actions.  In that respect 
NATO is much more accountable and therefore less likely to abuse the 
right to intervene than an alliance of repressive, unaccountable states.34  
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Unfortunately it is not obvious that Buchanan’s assertion is correct.  Whatever may be 
said in favor of the democratic peace hypothesis, historically democracies have been 
quite willing to intervene in non-democratic states even when doing so was not morally 
(and sometimes not legally) justifiable.  Such states might be just as willing as non-
liberal-democratic states to abuse a unilateral right to humanitarian intervention; indeed, 
some might conjecture that had such a right existed in 2003, the U.S. would have 
appealed to it as part of its overall legal justification for invading Iraq.  It is important to 
recognize, too, that in the past non-liberal-democratic states have sometimes intervened 
in other states to bring an end to genuine humanitarian disasters.  It is not clear, therefore, 
that a unilateral right to humanitarian intervention limited to liberal-democratic states 
would result in fewer overall violations of basic human rights than would a similar right 
restricted to multi-state organizations composed of both powerful and weak states. 
The conclusions of this paper are modest, yet potentially of great significance.  
They are modest because no positive argument has been presented to support the claim 
that the reform of international law to include a unilateral right to humanitarian 
intervention, exercisable by multi-state organizations with a particular kind of 
constituency and decision-structure, would in fact better secure basic human rights than 
does the current international legal system.  If successful, however, the arguments herein 
do entail that such a possibility has been too quickly dismissed in past discussions.  The 
significance of this paper, then, lies in the possibility that it will encourage political 
leaders and theorists to consider more carefully the likelihood that the inclusion of a 
unilateral right to humanitarian intervention will morally improve the international legal 
system, perhaps even with the end result that disasters like those presently occurring in 
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Darfur are dealt with sooner, and with fewer of those harms constitutive of basic human 
rights violations. 
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